Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A0018001180016378-77 3 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Executive Registry

SUBJECT: Turner to Brzezinski Memo on Scientific Exchange with the USSR (ER 77-133/4 of 21 April 1977)

- Bob Kimmitt of the NSC called me to let me know that the attached memo from the DCI to Brzezinski has been the subject of discussions between NSC, OSTP, State and Defense and that Frank Press (the President's science adviser) is looking at this issue as part of a growing concern with the entire West to East technology transfer policy problem.
- Kimmitt wanted us to know that NSC is not dropping the ball although they are not yet ready to provide any new guidance.
- Kimmitt is now working on the creation of a new PRM exercise on technology transfer and export controls which will be handled through the SCC rather than the PRC mechanism. PRM is to be chaired by Ben Huberman of Frank Press's office . and cochaired by Jessica Tuchman. The scientific data exchange issue will presumably be folded into that exercise.
- I doubt that Admiral Turner needs to be bothered with this procedural matter at this time. I am circulating this memo to , Executive Secretariat, IC Staff (McMahon), and Chairman, COMEX () for their info so that the loop on the attached memo is closed.

25X1 National Intelligence Officer for Economics Vefense

Attachment: ER 77-133/4

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Cy-SA/DCI

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP80M00165A00 10008-60 Registry

2 1 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Exchange of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data

with Communist Nations

- 1. Attached is a series of exchange correspondence between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense wherein the DCI expressed his concern about the expanding exchange of U.S. scientific and technical data with Communist nations and urged the Department of Defense to take certain actions which might aid in the protection of classified U.S. information.
- At the same time the DCI stimulated several of the DCI committees to develop a plan of attack on the problem from an intelligence standpoint.
- In early April Deputy Secretary Duncan indicated that he was directing certain elements of his staff to study several of the problems associated with exchange data with a view towards devising the necessary organizational arrangements to deal with them. He recommended that I call this problem to the attention of the National Security Council so that the Defense efforts could be addressed in concert with other departments, particularly the Departments of State and Commerce.
- 4. We would welcome the National Security Council's advice and guidance on this matter.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER Admiral, U.S. Navy

Attachments:

1. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 6 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/3)
2. Ltr DepSecDef fr DCI 5 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/3A)

3. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 19 Mar 77 (ER77-133/2)

4. Ltr SecDef fr DCI 12 Jan 77 (ER 77-/33)

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11:: CIA-RDP80M00165A001600110008-6

5 APR 1071

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Charlie:

I appreciate your calling the DCI's 12 January 1977 letter to my attention. Technology transfer and the exchange of scientific and technical data well merit close scrutiny. Whatever the Department of Defense can do to strengthen its support to the procedures devised to monitor the exchange, I believe is highly desirable.

I endorse the 12 January letter and appreciate your attention.

Yours,

To Hot on water or storing

STANSFIELD TURNER Admiral, U.S. Navy

Distribution:

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001600110008

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 9 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Attached is a 12 January 77 memorandum from George Bush on the subject of U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations. Although we are prepared to respond in a positive fashion to George's suggestions I would like to have the benefit of your own thinking before we move further.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Attachment a/s

SECKE BROWN 77 LSACKEE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 January 1977

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don:

There is concern throughout the U.S. Government about the expanding U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations through the visits of delegations, development of cooperative joint projects, and commercial agreements. The Intelligence Community has only a limited role in assisting those who attempt to maintain a relative balance in what the U.S. gains and loses through these programs. Our efforts in recent years to perform this function, however, have been frustrated by the scope of the programs, lack of centralized U.S. management and the absence of any systematic record of the who-what-where of U.S. Communist contacts.

At the present time I have energized the DCI Committee on Exchanges, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee to draw some focus and develop a plan of attack on this problem from an intelligence standpoint. This is an enormous task.

The Department of Defense plays a large role in U.S. Government mechanisms to administer and assess these programs through its involvements in export control, protection of classified U.S. defense information, and the DCI Committees mentioned. I would like to call to your attention some actions which the Department could take which would assist this process:

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(b) Reconsideration of DoD support to the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security (ICIS).

ICIS develops internal security procedures for Communist nation visitors to the U.S. and establishes U.S. visa procedures for these visitors. ICIS regulations provide the only legal basis for the State Department's provision of alert information on these visitors to intelligence and security elements of the U.S. Government. Stronger ICIS enforcement of already approved procedures might be helpful.

(c) Reconsideration of DoD procedures to alert U.S. defense contractors about impending Communist visitors.

I understand that DoD currently relies on the State Department to communicate and enforce security opinions provided by DoD intelligence components to contractor facilities. State, however, lacks the authority and capability to do so.

I will appreciate your consideration of the points raised in this letter and would welcome your comments and advice.

Sincerely,

George Bush

(18Apr77)

Distribution for DCI/IC 77-0177

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6

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
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Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

19 April 1977

NOTE FOR: The Director

Exchange of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data with Communist SUBJECT:

Nations

Stan,

I recommend you send the attached package to Zbig for info.

The purpose is to bring Zbig up to date on the exchange of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data with Communist Nations.

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Attachment

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip

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The Director of Central Intelligence

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77-133/24

5 APR 1977

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

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Yours,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER Admiral, U.S. Navy

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(28Mar/7)
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(rewritten 29Mar/7)

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77-133/2

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 9 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

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Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Attachment a/s

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 January 1977

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don:

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(b) Reconsideration of DoD support to the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security (ICIS).

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110008-6 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DCI/IC 77-0152

Executive Registry
77-133

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

12 JAN 1977

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/s/ George Bush

George Bush


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Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP80M00165



Deputy to the DCI of the Intelligence Community

10 JAN 1977

NOTE FOR THE DCI

The attached is an effort to draw DOD's attention and support to the technology transfer problem. It by no means is a comprehensive solution to technology transfer, but it is a reasonable step towards getting some handle on what the visiting Soviets are up to in the US.

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Admiral, USN D/DCI/IC

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